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I. INTRODUCTION
A large gap exists between the number of women holding man-
agement positions' in the United States and Japan. Currently, women
represent 37% of top managerial positions in U.S. corporations. 2
Figures in Japan are significantly lower. Only 1.29%o of the managers
in Japanese companies are female and less than 0.2% hold the higher
managerial positions of division chief or corporate director.3 These
statistics, coupled with current problems of sex discrimination in
Japan,4 suggest that as business contacts between these countries
increase so will the likelihood of sex discrimination by corporations
in both countries.
In 1987, the United States was Japan's largest export market,
receiving more than 30% of its total exports. 5 During that same year,
1. This Comment defines the phrase "management position" or "management" consis-
tently with the definition of "manager" in BLACK'S LAW DicnioNARY 865 (5th ed. 1979).
Black's defines "manager" as "One who has charge of a corporation and control of its
business, or of its branch establishments, divisions, or departments, and who is vested with a
certain amount of discretion and independent judgment." Id.
The Treaty of Friendship, discussed infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text, does not
define "management," but the history of the treaty language suggests that the above definition
is consistent with the parties' intended meaning of the term.
2. Los Angeles Times, July 13, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
3. See generally Woman in Japan's Labor Force, JAPAN EcoN. INsT. (JEI) REP. No.
18A, May 5, 1989 [hereinafter JEI REPORT] (report on the attitudes toward women in the
Japanese workforce and the number of women represented in the corporate world).
4. See Los Angeles Times, July 13, 1988, at 1, col. 1. See also JEI REPORT, supra note
3 (explaining attitudes toward women in the Japanese corporate workforce).
5. Trends in Japan's Foreign Trade, JAPA ExmastAL TRADE ORo. (JETRO), Mar. 1989,
at 25.
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11.7% of the United States' total exports were sent to Japan,
representing the United States' second largest export market. 6 Al-
though U.S. exports to Japan have steadily increased during the past
three years,7 the nearly 20% differential in the 1987 numbers has
forced the United States to rethink current trade arrangements with
Japan. 8 Pressure placed on Congress by U.S. businesses, urging equal
trade distributions between the two countries, has been successful in
slowly tearing down the trade barriers erected by the Japanese.9
As trade barriers fall, trade between the United States and Japan
will likely grow as will the contact between all international busi-
nesses. 10 The increase in contact between Japanese and U.S. businesses
will expose Japanese companies to a facet of the business world that
they are not accustomed to dealing with: women in management
positions." Japanese corporations have not yet accepted women into
their business world. 12 This Japanese cultural aversion to women in
6. JETRO, HANDY FACTS ON U.S.-JAPAN ECON. REL. 2 (1989) [hereinafter HANDY
FACTS].
7. Id. Japan is the second largest export market for the United States. Exports to Japan
have increased from U.S. $26.9 billion in 1986, to U.S. $28.2 billion in 1987 and U.S. $37.7
billion in 1988. In 1988, exports to Japan comprised 11.7% of the United States' total exports.
Id.
8. N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1990, at 1, col. 1. President George Bush and Japanese Prime
Minister Joshiki Kaifu pledged to take serious action to improve the trade equalities between
the two countries. Id.
9. Chanda, Taking the Middle Road, 135 FAR E. ECON. RV. 1, 55-56 (1987). Congress
attempted to end "unfair trade practices" by toughening up the United States trade policy.
The proposed legislation would require the President to impose tariffs on countries which do
not have equal trade distributions. Japan's virtual exclusion of United States firms from
competing on the Osaka airport project and from the supercomputer market is especially
troublesome to the legislators. Id.
10. These increases will likely reflect the communication between newly formed overseas
branch offices and their corporate headquarters. Also, the increase in trade between the United
States and Japan will increase the contacts between international trade businesses.
11. "According to a Harvard Business Review survey, men have come a long way in their
thinking about working women in the last two decades. In 1965, 50 percent of men surveyed
said they thought women did not want top jobs; fewer then 10 percent of a group of men
surveyed 20 years later held the same belief." Royer, Jarvis, Borger & Schafer, The Break-
through Generation, 20 CoRP. RaP. MINN. 9 (1989). In addition to this increase, the number
of women in managerial positions increased 150% during the same period. Brown, Unsteady
Progress Myths Hover Like a Haze Over Women's Abilities, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 27, 1989,
at 5, zone C. Furthermore, the number of women holding bachelor degrees in business and
management jumped from 20% in 1975-76, to 44% in 1984-85. The number of masters degrees
in the same subject area increased from 12% to 31%. Timmons, A Woman's Place is in the
Upper Ranks, Bus. INs., Apr. 11, 1988, at 29.
12. JEI REPORT, supra note 3, at 2, 4-5. A Japanese poll discovered that even though
65% of the respondents surveyed in 1986 favored women holding supervisorial pogitions, only
23% said they would actually want to work for a woman. This is true even though the Equal
Employment Opportunity Law of 1986 was passed in order to make unlawful discriminatory
practices such as advertising that a position should be filled by a specific sex. In a survey by
Nihon Keizai Shimbun only three and one-half percent of the responding companies said they
provided new management positions to women under the new law, and 25% of those already
had programs for women managers. Id.
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management may create fears in U.S. businesses. American compa-
nies may encourage their overseas management to discriminate against
females by refusing to promote them into management positions.
Moreover, Japanese imports now include more than just the products
they sell; sex discrimination by Japanese employers is allegedly on
the increase. 13 As Japanese businesses grow in the United States,
their practice of sex discrimination will grow proportionately unless
U.S. laws are applied to stop its growth.
This comment will first examine the question of whether Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act14 applies to foreign corporations oper-
ating in the United States. It will then determine if jurisdiction under
Title VII is altered in any way by the United States-Japan Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. 15 The paper will determine if
there is a way in which the two may be read consistently, and if
not, which should control. Finally, this paper will examine the
extraterritorial application of Title VII to U.S, corporations operating
abroad.
II. APPLICATION OF TITLE VII TO JAPANESE CORPORATIONS
PROTECTED BY THE U.S.-JAPAN TREATY OF FImNDsmIP
In the United States, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act16
(hereinafter Act or Title VII) is the premier employment law regu-
lating a corporation's power to hire, promote, or retain employees.' 7
The Act's specific prohibitions' 8 are an essential weapon in the war
against sex discrimination.' 9 A violation of Title VII subjects the
13. Los Angeles Times, July 13, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. 1985),
15. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I,A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter Friendship Treaty].
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. 1985).
17. Id. For examples of other employment laws affecting an employer's ability to define
the workplace, see Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 402(c) (1982
& Supp. 1986); Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
Other laws prohibiting sex discrimination include the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §
206(d) (1982 & Supp. 1986), amending the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §
201(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986). The Equal Pay Act prohibits pay differentials based on sex. Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1982 & Supp. 1985) provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(a)(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.
Id.
19. See infra note 23 for a definition of sex discrimination.
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offender to severe legal consequences. 20 Japanese corporations dis-
criminating in the United States, however, may not face these con-
sequences. Article VIII(l) of the 1953 Treaty of Friendship between
the United States and Japan allows Japanese corporations operating
in the United States to hire management employees "of their choice."' 2'
Some Japanese companies argue that this language permits them to
hire management employees without being subjected to U.S. em-
ployment laws, including Title VII.22
If the Treaty truly allows Japanese corporations to discriminate, a
direct conflict with Title VII exists. Such a conflict renders either
Title VII or the Treaty ineffective. The only way to avoid this result
is to reconcile the provisions which appear to conflict. In order to
reconcile the apparently conflicting provisions in Title VII and the
Treaty, one must look past the plain language of the provisions to
the purpose and intent behind them.
A. Title VII
1. General Purpose and Intent of the Act
Title VII was designed to end employment discrimination based
on race, creed, color, national origin, and sex. The Act specifically
states:
[i]t shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin, or ... to
20. Depending upon the violation, an employer may be subject to an order to cease its
discriminatory practices, be forced to reinstate the employee, pay back wages, or take other
action to eliminate the discrimination. U.S. Comm'N OoNCrm Riorrs, A GUIDE To FEDERAL
LAWS PRoHmBrrING SEx DISCRIMINATION, CLEARINoHOUSE PuB. No. 46, at 12 (1974).
21. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 44, 96-97 and accompanying text discussing Sumitomo Shoji America,
Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); and Spiess v. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.
1981).
23. Id. Title VII restrictions encompass both discrimination based on gender and sexual
harassment. See Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977)
(sexual harassment prohibited by Title VII), rev'd on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir.
1978). This Comment will refer to both forms of discrimination as "sex discrimination".
This Comment does not address sexual orientation discrimination. Sexual orientation dis-
crimination has not been prohibited under Title VII. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,
Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination applied only
to gender discrimination).
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limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.24
Under the Act, "employer" is defined as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees
. ., while an "employee" is "an individual employed by an
employer.' '26 The Act also enumerates classes of employees who are
exempt from coverage. 27
Title VII does not specifically address foreign corporations doing
business in the United States, 28 nor does it address corporations
operating abroad. 29 Because the Act is silent in these two areas, its
jurisdictional reach will extend to these employers only if Congres-
sional intent to extend such jurisdiction can be shown.3 0
2. Congressional Intent under Title VII
When Congress enacted Title VII, its purpose was to
'remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate commerce and
foreign commerce and to insure the complete and full enjoyment
by all persons of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured and
protected by the Constitution.' The Act evinces Congress' broad
purpose to eliminate all vestiges of discrimination in the American
workplace.3
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green32, the United States Supreme
Court found that Congress intended for Title VII to ensure "the
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
27. See infra note 72.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. 1985).
29. Id.
30. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22
(1962) (citing Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)). The United
States Supreme Court has confirmed that Congress has the right to control the activities of
U.S. citizens abroad. To determine whether Congress has exercised that control "there must
be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed." Id. See also Foley
Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1948), in which the Court noted that "The question
is rather whether Congress intended to make the law applicable to such work." Id. at 284-85.
See also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282-83 (1952). The Steele court stated
that "[r]esolution of the jurisdictional issue in this case therefore depends on construction of
exercised congressional power, not the limitations upon that power itself." Id.
In Ward v. W & H Voortman, Ltd., 685 F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Ala. 1988), the court
determined, based on congressional intent, that Title VII applied to foreign corporations
operating in the United States. Id. at 232-33.
31. Voortman, 685 F. Supp. at 232 (citing H. RP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEWS 2391, 2402).
32. 411 U.S. 792 (1972).
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removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employ-
ment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classifications." 33 Discrimina-
tory acts under Title VII are punishable absent the existence of a
valid defense. 34
3. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exception
Under Title VII, an employer may legally discriminate if it can
show that the selection was based on a Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification (BFOQ) .3  The BFOQ exception allows an employer to
discriminate if the discrimination is reasonably necessary to business
operations. 36 In order to successfully defend a discrimination charge
on the basis of a valid business necessity, an employer must meet
two requirements: (1) the BFOQ is necessary to business operations,
and (2) there is reasonable cause to believe that, in the case of a
preference for males, females would be unable to perform the job
efficiently. 37
Regarding the first requirement, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits
have held that the business necessity test is not merely a business
convenience test. 38 In Diaz v. Pan American World Airlines, the
Fifth Circuit held that "discrimination based on sex is only valid
when the essence of the business operation would be undermined by
33. Id. at 801 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971)). See also
Quijano v. University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980) (definition of employer
in Title VII entitled to liberal construction); Williams v. City of Montgomery, 742 F.2d 586
(lth Cir. 1984) (definition of employer in Title VII should be liberally construed).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. 1985).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(e) (1982 & Supp. 1985). Title VII provides, in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (1) it shall not be an unlawful
practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, . . . on the basis of his
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise....
Id.
36. Id.
37. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1976). See also
Japanese Companies on United States Soil, 9 HAsTIWGS INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 377, 399 (1986)
[hereinafter Treaty Privileges].
38. See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971);
Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 1974). In Dlaz, the court
rejected Pan American's BFOQ defense to the charge of sex discrimination. Pan American
argued that its female-only restriction on flight attendants was a BFOQ because male attendants
could not cater to the psychological needs of the passengers as adequately as females. The
court rejected this claim and found that this was merely tangential to the essence of the
business involved. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388.
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not hiring members of one sex exclusively. ' 39 As to the second
requirement, in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph,4'
the Fifth Circuit also held that the employer has the burden to prove
that "he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for
believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to
perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved. '41
Moreover, opinions by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC), Title VII's enforcing agency which investigates and
prosecutes alleged violations filed by employees, 42 confirm that the
BFOQ exception is "meant to be an extremely narrow exception to
the general prohibition of discrimination. '43
B. Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court, in Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc. v. Avagliano,44 held that a Japanese subsidiary incor-
porated in the United States was not protected from U.S. discrimi-
nation regulations under the United States-Japan Treaty of
Friendship. 45 The Court reasoned that by virtue of its domestic
incorporation, Sumitomo was a U.S. corporation and, therefore,
subject to U.S. law.46 Finding that the corporation was not protected
under the Treaty, the Court did not reach the question of whether
the "of your choice" language expressed in Article VIII(l) of the
Treaty provides a viable defense for a sex discrimination charge
39. 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971). The essence of this holding was followed in
Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 1974).
40. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
41. Id. at 235.
42. U.S. COMos'N ON CIvil RIGHTS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL LAWS PROIBITING SEX Dis-
CRBiiNATiON 7-8, 12 (1974). The Commission may conduct independent investigations of
discrimination. The Commission also issues administrative opinions regarding Title VII. Id.
43. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 326 (1977);
EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.2(a)(2), 1606.4 (1982).
44. 457 U.S. 176, 179 (1982). In Sumitomo, an American subsidiary of a Japanese
corporation was sued under Title VII for sex discrimination. The plaintiffs claimed that the
corporation refused to promote them because they were female. The United States Supreme
Court determined that the Friendship Treaty, supra note 15, did not protect the subsidiary
from Title VII violations since it was incorporated in the United States. Incorporation in the
United States transformed the Japanese corporation into a United States corporation. This
caused Sumitomo to lose whatever protection that may have been available under the Treaty
and assume the same obligations as a United States corporation. Id.
45. Id. at 189.
46. Id. at 179. The Court stated that "we are persuaded, as both signatories agree, that
under the literal language of Article XXII(3) of the Treaty, Sumitomo is a company of the
United States; we discern no reason to depart from the plain meaning of the Treaty language.
Accordingly, we hold that Sumitomo is not a company of Japan and thus is not covered by
Article VIII(l) of the Treaty." Id. at 189.
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under Title VII.47 In order to determine whether Article VIII(I)
provides a viable defense, the Treaty's plain language, purpose and
history must be examined.
Following World War II, a series of separate treaties were entered
into between the United States and various countries, including
Japan. 48 Generally, the treaties were enacted to ensure that corpo-
rations, both foreign and domestic, operate on equal footing. 49 The
purpose of these treaties, called Treaties of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, was two-fold. First, the treaty afforded participating
countries the opportunity to control their domestic corporations
abroad while at the same time promoting international trade.5 0 Prior
to the adoption of friendship treaties, few countries legally recognized
foreign corporations." Without legal recognition, international busi-
ness operations proved difficult.5 2 Corporations lacked access to
foreign court systems and could not, therefore, sue or defend suits
brought against them. 53 Access to legal recourse was available only
after incorporation in the host country. 54 Foreign incorporation proved
a costly alternative and hampered international trade. 5 Second, the
treaties were intended to serve as vehicles for increasing international
trade by providing protection to foreign businesses.5 6 In essence, the
47. Id.
48. The United States has entered into Treaties of Friendship with countries such as
China, 1946; Korea, 1956; Italy, 1948; Ireland, 1950; Colombia, 1951; the Federal Republic
of Germany, 1954; and the Netherlands, 1956. For more on the Treaties of Friendship and
the countries who have entered into them, see Walker, Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement
and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 229,
230 (1956) [hereinafter Walker, Jr., United States Practice]. For a partial list of the Friendship
Treaties, see 1 I.L.M. 92, 94 (1962).
49. Walker, Jr., United States Practice, supra note 48, at 230.
50. See id. at 232; Walker, Jr., Provisions on Companies in U.S. Commercial Treaties,
50 Am. J. INT'L L. 373, 385 (1956) [hereinafter Walker, Jr., Provisions].
51. Walker, Jr., Provisions, supra note 50, at 373.
52. Id.
53. Id. Most treaties up until the last quarter of the nineteenth century extended rights
to "citizens" or "nationals." These titles did not include corporations. On this point, Chief
Justice Taney noted that "[a] corporation ... is a creature of sovereignty which can exist
only within the jurisdiction of the state creating it and cannot move or migrate outside that
jurisdiction." Id. at 375 (citing Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 588 (1839)).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Walker, Jr., United States Practice, supra note 48, at 232. The author found that
these treaties were made to address the right of citizens of each country to establish and carry
on business activities within the other country and to receive due protection for their persons
and businesses. Additionally, the treaties were to afford equal protection of the laws of the
host country and allow the corporation to enjoy the same legal opportunity allowed to the
citizens of their own country. Id.
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treaty terms provide national treatment for foreign corporations,
including equal access to the court systems. 7
C. United States-Japan Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation
In 1953, the United States entered into a Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with Japan (hereinafter Treaty).5 8 The
Treaty provides various rights to corporations, including equal access
to court systems, leasing and purchasing land, and obtaining trade-
marks.5 9 In addition to granting legal recognition to foreign corpo-
rations, the Treaty gives corporations the right to control their
management6
Article VIII(l) of the Friendship Treaty states, "companies of
either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of
the other Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive
personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice. ' 61
A literal reading of this provision suggests that a corporation can
choose any person it desires when hiring employees who fall into
one of the enumerated positions.6 2 If applied literally, Article VIII(l)
conflicts with the Title VII restrictions .63 With the increase in business
contacts between Japan and the United States,6 the effect of the
Treaty language on Title VII must be resolved, particularly in light
of increasing evidence that Japanese employers may be importing
discriminatory business practices to the United States.65
57. Walker, Jr., Provisions, supra note 50, at 384. Additionally, foreign corporations
were granted equal access to administrative tribunals and agencies. Furthermore, foreign
corporations who entered the host country for the sole purpose of litigation would not have
to meet the business registration requirements they would have to meet if they were doing
business in the host country. Id.
58. Friendship Treaty, supra note 15, at art. VIII(l).
59. Id. at art. IV(l). Article IV(l) provides equal access to the parties' court systems. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at art. VIII(l).
62. Id. It is clear that this language would not give such freedom for positions which do
not fit into the named classes. In discussing the purpose of employment provisions in treaties
such as the Friendship Treaty, supra note 15, Herman Walker, Jr., noted that the provisions
were to apply to "essential executive and technical personnel." Walker, Jr., Provisions, supra
note 50, at 386.
63. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. 1985) (Title VII prohibits sex discrimination)
with Friendship Treaty, supra note 15, at art. VIII(l) (Japanese corporations may hire managers
"of their choice").
64. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 13.
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D. Application of Title VII to Foreign Corporation Operations
in the United States
Foreign corporations doing business in the United States have been
held liable under Title VII6 even though the Act does not specifically
address themA7 In Ward v. W & H Voortman,6 the Federal District
Court, Middle District of Alabama, held a Canadian company liable
for Title VII violations.69 The court reached its finding by examining
the plain language of Title VII.7 The court stated that the language
of Title VII, when reasonably construed, is sufficiently broad in
scope to cover all corporations operating in the United States. 7' The
court relied on the provisions in Title VII which specifically exclude
various groups72 to support its finding. 73 The court reasoned that
66. 685 F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Ala. 1988). In Voortman, the plaintiff sued a Canadian
company for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. The plaintiff was a United States
citizen who applied for a position with the defendant to work for the defendant as its product
distributor in Alabama. Id. The court held that Title VII prohibits foreign corporations from
discriminating against American employees who work for the company in the United States.
Additionally, the court found that Title VII forbids sex discrimination regardless of where the
business is incorporated. The court reasoned that if Congress did not want these corporations
to be within the reach of Title VII, they would have specifically excluded them from coverage
just as they did other employment situations, i.e., employment of aliens abroad by U.S.
corporations. Id. at 232-33.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. 1985).
68. 685 F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
69. Voortman, 685 F. Supp. at 231.
70. Id.
71. From the plain meaning of its words, Title VII does appear to apply to all corporations
operating in the United States, whether domestic or foreign. Certain foreign corporations may
benefit from various treaties or international agreements which exclude them from this coverage.
See infra notes 84-91. The Act defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or proceeding calendar year, and any agent of
such a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
"Commerce" is defined in the Act as "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission,
or communication among the several States; or between a State and any place outside thereof;
or within the District of Columbia, or a possession of the United States; or between points in
the same State but through a point outside thereof." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g) (1982 & Supp.
1985).
The Act then states
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) & (a)(l) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
72. The Act excludes from coverage aliens employed by employers outside any state, bona
fide private membership clubs, employers with less then 15 employees, and religious discrim-
ination practiced by religious institutions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 & (b) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
73. Voortman, 685 F. Supp. at 231.
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Congress' failure to explicitly exempt foreign corporations from the
Act, coupled with the specific delineation of those groups free from
coverage, bolsters its contention. If Congress had intended to exclude
foreign corporations from coverage under Title VII, the court argued,
express language specifically reflecting this intent would be present.
74
The court concluded that by not expressly or impliedly excluding
foreign corporations, Congress undoubtedly intended Title VII res-
trictions on sex discrimination to apply to corporations operating in
the United States regardless of the place of their incorporation.
75
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue of whether Title VII applies to foreign corporations doing
business in the United States, the Voortman analysis will likely be
adopted. As noted previously, 76 the United States Supreme Court has
stated that the purpose of Title VII is to remove discriminatory
barriers to employment. 77 This pronouncement has caused other
courts to interpret Title VII, particularly the definition of employer,
as requiring a liberal construction. 78 A broad reading of Title VII
most certainly encompasses a foreign corporation operating in the
United States.
The EEOC's stated policy is that Title VII applies equally to
foreign and domestic employers operating within the United States.
79
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court gave great deference
to EEOC policy and opinion in Griggs v. Duke Power.80 In Griggs,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued an advisory
opinion concerning the seminal issue in dispute.81 On review, the
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he administrative interpretation of the
Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference." '82 This
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
77. Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). See also McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (purpose of Title VII to remove discriminatory
barriers).
78. See Quijano v. University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980); Williams
v. City of Montgomery, 742 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1984).
79. EEOC Issues Guidance for Handling Bias Charges Against Foreign Companies, U.S.
Employers Overseas, 183 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-1 (Sept. 21, 1988) (WESTLAW, Labor
& Employment, Specialized Databases, BNA-DLR.) See also Note, Commercial Treaties and
the American Civil Rights Laws: The Case of the Japanese Employers, 31 STAN. L. REv. 947
(1979).
80. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
81. Id. at 433. The Court stated "since the Act and its legislative'history support the
commission's construction, this affords good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the
will of Congress." Id. at 434.
82. Id. at 433-34.
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opinion is another strong factor indicating that the Supreme Court
will follow Voortman and hold foreign corporations doing business
in the United States liable under Title VII. 3 Despite these holdings,
the application of Title VII to foreign corporations operating in the
United States leaves unanswered the question concerning the effect
that Article VIII(l) of the Friendship Treaty will have when a
Japanese corporation violates Title VII.
1. Statutory Rights vs. Treaty Obligations: Which Controls?
If Article VIII(l) of the Treaty permits a Japanese company to
hire at its own discretion, may the company do so in a way that
violates Title VII? In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano 4
a Japanese company argued that upon literal reading, the Article's
language permitted it to fill the positions enumerated in the Article
regardless of Title VII's provisions."' Without reaching this issue, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Treaty did not aiply since
the defendant, Sumitomo, was incorporated in the United States. 86
Sumitomo's argument, when considered in light of general interna-
tional and U.S. law governing conflicts between statutes and treaties,
must fail because the Treaty is not a defense to Title VII.
Customary international law requires that in treaty interpretation,
the parties' intentions are determined by reference to the express
words used in light of the surrounding circumstances. 87 When inter-
83. Id. at 434.
84. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
85. Id. at 179, 189. See MacNamara v. Korean Air Line, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988). In
Sumitomo, the Court determined that the defendant corporation did not benefit from the protection
of the treaty since it was incorporated in the United States. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189. In
MacNamara, the Court found that the treaty protected companies from Title VII restraints in that
they could hire their own citizens over United States citizens. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1141.
86. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189.
87. LORD McNAIR, LAw OF TrATEs 365 (1961) [hereinafter McNAMR]. Lord McNair also
states that:
[i]n any definition or description of interpretation some reference to the words
actually used is essential, because it can happen that a party sometimes has a mental
reservation as to the meaning that he may hope to attribute to them in the future
in the event of a dispute arising.
Id.
Lord McNair cites to a study done by Fitzmaurice of the decisions of the International
Court of Justice involving interpretation of treaties. Fitzmaurice detected five principles in
treaty interpretation.
1. Actuality (or textual interpretation);
2. Natural or ordinary meaning;
3. Integration (or interpretation of the treaty as a whole);
4. Effectiveness;
5. Subsequent Practice; Contemporaneity (interpretation of texts and terms in
light of their normal meaning at the date of conclusion.)
Id. See also I. SiNcLAiR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIEs 114-19 (1984)
(treaty interpretation).
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preting treaty language, the United States Supreme Court requires
that "[tihe clear import of treaty language controls unless 'application
of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects
a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signato-
ries.''' 8 However, if a treaty conflicts with an act of Congress "the
last expression of the sovereign will control." '89 Congressional acts
are held to be in conflict with treaties only if there is clear legislative
intent that the subsequent legislation was meant to affect the treaty
obligations. 9° Applying this analysis to Title VII and Article VIII(l)
of the Treaty, Title VII would control. 91
2. Reconciling the United States-Japan Treaty of Friendship
and Title VII
There are no provisions in Title VII which state that it was intended
to affect the rights and obligations of the United States under the
Treaty.92 Therefore, a literal reading of the Treaty tentatively indicates
that sex discrimination is permissible. However, a thorough analysis
of the Treaty requires one to examine the motives and intent of the
drafters. 93 United States case law provides guidance in interpreting
the Treaty.94 Although the Treaty has been interpreted to provide
equal treatment of domestic and foreign corporations, 95 the Fifth
Circuit, in Spiess v. Itoh,96 found the "of your choice" language in
Article VIII(l) to be an exception to the equality of treatment. 97 The
88. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 180 (citing Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963)).
89. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720-21 (1893). The Court also held
that "[b]y the Constitution, laws made in pursuance thereof and treaties made under the
authority of the United States are both declared to be the supreme law of the land and no
paramount authority is given to one over the other." Id.
90. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1146 (3d Cir. 1988).
91. See infra notes 94-111 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 23-34 & 58-65 discussing relevant sections of Title VII and Friendship
Treaty.
93. McNAi, supra note 87, at 365.
94. In Sumitomo, the Court stated that the plain language would control unless 'appli-
cation of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent
with the intent or expectations of its signatories."' Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano,
457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (citing Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963)).
95. See supra notes 58-65.
96. Spiess v. Itoh & Co., Inc., 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981).
97. Id. at 360-61. In Spiess, the court found the "of your choice" language was "not to
guarantee national treatment, but to create an absolute rule permitting foreign nationals to
control their overseas investments." Id. at 360. The court then went on to say "considering
the Treaty as a whole the only reasonable interpretation is that Article VIII(1) means exactly
what it says: companies have a right to decide which executives and technicians will manage
their investments in the host country without regard to host country laws." Id. Reading the
negotiation history of both Title VII and the Treaties together with the interpretation of the
provision, the court held that the "of your choice" language provided a defense to Title VII.
Id. at 361.
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Spiess court held that Article VIII(l) gives Japanese companies the
unbridled right to hire employees of their choice without regard to
Title VII's provisions. 98 This holding is in direct conflict with the
more recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion of Sumitomo.99 In Sumi-
tomo, the Supreme Court stated that the Treaty's purpose is "not
to give foreign corporations greater rights than domestic companies,
but instead to assure them the right to conduct business on an equal
basis without suffering discrimination based on their alienage." ' 1°°
Even though the Court's statements are dicta, they indicate that the
Spiess interpretation of the Treaty is inaccurate.
Moreover, the history of the Treaty negotiations supports the
conclusion that Article VIII(l) does not provide a defense to Title
VII. 101 First, when the Treaty was negotiated, the Japanese Consti-
tution already prohibited sex discrimination."°2 The Treaty drafters
could not have intended to allow sex discrimination in contravention
of the Japanese Constitution. Second, the plain language of Article
VIII(l), together with the underlying motives for its inclusion, indi-
cates that the main purpose of Article VIII(l) is to allow foreign
corporations to hire upper management employees without regard to
citizenship. 03 The "of your choice" terminology in Article VIII(l)
was added to the Treaty at the urging of the United States,'04 which
wanted that specific language in order to maintain control of U.S.
corporations doing business outside its borders. 10 5 The United States
was motivated by a desire to avoid hiring quotas,106 and to ensure
the ability of U.S. corporations to control the management of their
overseas operations.' °7 The negotiation history suggests that the lan-
guage was envisioned only as an exception to a quota requirement,
98. Id. at 360-61.
99. See Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 187-88.
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
102. KENP6 (JAPANESE CoNsT.), ch. III, art. 14. Article 14 provides: "All the people are
equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social
relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin." Id.
103. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). Citizenship differs from national
origin. National origin refers to "the country where a person was born, or more broadly, the
country from which his or her ancestors came." In footnote 2 of the Espinoza opinion, the
Court stated "the term national origin does not embrace a requirement of United States
citizenship." Id. at 88 n.2.
104. Walker, Jr., United States Practice, supra note 48, at 236-37. See also, Treaty
Privileges, supra note 37, at 382-83.
105. Walker, Jr., United States Practice, supra note 48, at 236-37.
106. Id. The hiring quotas the United States wanted to avoid would require corporations
to employ a certain percentage or number of Japanese citizens. Id.
107. Id.
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not as a blanket defense to any and all employment laws. 08 Finally,
since Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on citizen-
ship,' °9 allowing protected corporations to avoid citizenship quotas is
consistent with both the history of the Treaty and the requirements
of Title VII."0 The failure to find a conflict between the two allows
Title VII to stand without interfering with the Treaty's protection.
Therefore, allowing sex discrimination under Article VIII(l) contra-
venes the purpose of the Treaty and violates Title VII."'
3. Public Policy Concerns
In addition to the historical interpretation above, strong U.S. public
policy concerns dictate that the Treaty cannot permit sex discrimi-
nation in contravention of Title VII. Title VII was enacted because
of the United States' aversion to needless discriminatory barriers to
employment." 2 Certain evidence now suggests that the Japanese are
importing their homogenous employment practices to the United
States."' If so, these practices are in direct conflict with U.S. public
policy. United States policy concerns should outweigh any concerns
the Japanese may raise in defending a continuation of their all male
managerial workforce." 4 A Japanese company's refusal to hire women
for managerial positions erects the exact barrier that Congress in-
tended for Title VII to tear down. Clarence Thomas, chairman of
the EEOC, expressed the United States' aversion to a homogenous
108. Id.
109. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). In Espinoza, the Court held that
the term "national origin" in Title VII did not include citizenship. By looking at the history
of discrimination based on citizenship in federal employment and Congress' deletion of the
word "ancestry" from the final version of Title VII, the Court reasoned that Congress did
not intend for citizenship discrimination to be included in Title VII. Id. at 89-91.
110. Id. See Walker, Jr., Provisions, supra note 50.
111. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
112. Id. As originally introduced, the bill did not address sex discrimination. It was later
amended to prohibit discrimination based on sex. The amendment was made by Congressman
Smith, Chairman of the House Rules Committee. Congressman Smith's motives for the
amendment appear less then commendable. It has been noted that "[h]is purpose was to sink
civil rights for blacks by adding a similar guarantee for women; although some congressmen
would grant equal rights for men of both races, Smith was certain that they would never
extend those rights to women." B. DmPnNrmLD, KEEPER OF THE RuLs 194-96 (1987). It was
further noted that in addition to wanting to derail the civil rights legislation, the addition of
sex discrimination to the act would assist southern businessmen, Congressman Smith's con-
stituency. His plan eventually backfired as the amendment was incorporated into the Act and
provided power for the women's movement. Id.
113. Los Angeles Times, July 13, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
114. See generally JEI REPORT, supra note 3. See also supra notes 1-4 & 11-13 and
accompanying text (discussing the attitude towards women in the Japanese business world).
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workforce. 115 Thomas said that "[h]omogeneity is antagonistic to
what we believe in this country ... I don't think we should import
those approaches which are antagonistic to civil rights or to the equal
employment opportunity laws in this country."11 6 Additionally, the
United States Supreme Court has stated that Congress' purpose in
enacting Title VII was to remove the discriminatory barriers to
employment." 7 Congress declared that the purpose of Title VII was
to provide "the opportunity for employment without discrimina-
tion.'' Together, these statements evince a strong policy in the
United States against sex discrimination and in favor of a diversified
workforce.
Express policies against sex discrimination espoused by both Japan
and the United States support the proposition that the Treaty should
not provide a valid defense to sex discrimination actions brought
under Title VII. If Article VIII(l) of the Treaty is limited to citizen-
ship discrimination, Japanese employers will be able to discriminate
on the basis of sex only within the defenses to Title VII." 9
4. Potential Japanese Attempts to Defend Against Title VII
Complaints
The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) 20 provides a
defense to sex discrimination in certain limited circumstances.12' Jap-
anese corporations, due to their apprehension in hiring women for
upper management positions, may assert the BFOQ exception to
justify an all male management team.'2 These corporations will likely
argue that the Japanese culture precludes women from effectively
fulfilling the requirements inherent in managerial positions.'2 Two
problems stand in the way of this argument. First, it necessitates a
broad application of the BFOQ defense, which is narrowly construed
115. Los Angeles Times, July 13, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
116. Id.
117. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
118. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963), reprinted in BNA, The Civil Rights
Act of 1964, What It Means to Employers, Businessmen, Unions, Employees and Minority
Groups 143 (1964).
119. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 35.
121. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 2-4 & 12-13.
123. Japanese employers in the United States have had a difficult time accepting females
as equals. Los Angeles Times, July 13, 1988, at 1, col. 1. See also 8 KODANSHA ENCYCLOPEDIA
oF JAPAN 265 (1983) (traditional Japanese view that women should devote their lives to their
homes and families; perpetuating discrimination of women in workforce).
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by the courts. 124 Second, Japanese employers would have to meet
both prongs of the "business necessity" test under the BFOQ excep-
tion. Under the first prong, the employer's action must be necessary
for the business. Under the second, they must demonstrate that there
is reasonable cause to believe that, in the case of a preference for
males, females would be unable to perform the job efficiently.125
Even though continual contacts between a branch office and its
home office in Japan may implicate certain aspects of the Japanese
culture, a Japanese company will have difficulty justifying the BFOQ
defense. When claiming that sex discrimination is essential to their
businesses, companies may argue that Japanese culture effectively
prevents them from hiring female managers. 126 Similar to the argu-
ments made during the civil rights era in the United States, assertions
by Japanese employers will reflect a fear that Japanese businesses
will falter if women are employed. However, just as the fears by
U.S. employers proved baseless, so will those of Japanese employers.
Japanese businesses operating in the United States cannot demon-
strate that sex discrimination is "essential" for their business oper-
ations. Although an all male management team may be convenient
for Japanese firms, mere convenience will not justify the BFOQ
defense.1 27 Japanese constitutional provisions which prohibit sex dis-
crimination strengthen this conclusion. 28
Japanese employers should have an equally difficult time meeting
the second prong of the BFOQ defense. The second prong would
require the Japanese employer to prove that gender renders the
applicant unable to perform the job. Given the increase of U.S.
women receiving advanced degrees in business and the number of
women currently holding managerial positions, 29 a Japanese company
would not be successful in arguing that, as a class, women would be
unable to perform efficiently.3 0 Similar concerns are raised when
124. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
125. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1976). See also
Treaty Privileges, supra note 37, at 399.
126. See supra notes 3-12.
127. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
128. Chapter III, Article 14, of the Japanese Constitution states that "All of the people
are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social
relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin." K!N'6, (JAPNESE CONST.),
ch. III, art. 14.
129. See supra note 11.
130. A Japanese company would probably meet the second requirement by demonstrating
the need for an employee who was familiar with their language and culture. See Treaty
Privileges, supra note 37, at 399. But this would be citizenship, not sex, discrimination. See
supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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U.S. employers discriminate against American employees in Japan.
Since the Treaty protects rather than regulates corporations operating
abroad, the Treaty is not an effective means for preventing sex
discrimination in these circumstances. Therefore, the issue of sex
discrimination by U.S. corporations operating abroad must be re-
solved under Title VII.
III. APPLICATION OF TITLE VII TO UNITED STATES CORPORATIONS
OPERATING ABROAD
A generally accepted proposition in international law is that a
country may regulate the foreign operations of its corporations to
the extent that the regulation does not infringe upon the authority
of the host nation."' However, in the United States, a presumption
exists that Congress is concerned only with the domestic application
of its laws. Thus, U.S. law will not be applied extraterritorially unless
one can show that Congress intended otherwise. Sex discrimination
by U.S. corporations operating in Japan will not be prohibited by
Title VII unless this congressional intent is found. The courts are
split on the question of whether Congress intended for Title VII to
be applied to the employment practices of U.S. corporations oper-
ating abroad. 3 2 Title VII does not specifically address the status of
U.S. citizens employed by U.S. corporations abroad, 33  but does
expressly exclude from coverage those aliens employed by the same
U.S. corporations. 34 This "alien exemption provision' 31 a5 is the basis
upon which the courts have analyzed the question of extraterritorial
application. 3 6
A. District Court Decisions
In Boureslan v. Aramco,137 the Fifth Circuit held that Congress'
failure to expressly grant extraterritorial jurisdiction to Title VII
131. Steel v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952). The Court stated the principle
as "the United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the
conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of
other nations or their nationals are not infringed." Id. at 286 (citing Skiriotes v. Florida, 313
U.S. 69, 73 (1941)).
132. Bryant v. International School Serv., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 675 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1982). The district court of New Jersey suggests that
Title VII does apply extraterritorially. Id. at 483. The Fifth Circuit has held the opposite and
concluded that Title VII lacks extraterritorial jurisdiction. Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d
1014 (5th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. 1985). Title VII is silent in this respect. Id.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
135. Id.
136. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
137. 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988). In Boureslan, the plaintiff was a United States citizen
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prohibits its application to U.S. corporations operating abroad.138
Applying the generally accepted view that Congress is concerned only
with domestic conditions, the court's initial presumption was that
Congress did not intend for Title VII to apply extraterritorially. After
addressing both the specific language of the Act and the lack of any
substantial legislative history supporting extraterritorial application,
the court held that the Act must be read narrowly. 139 The plaintiff
argued that the Act's "alien exemption provision" created a negative
inference supporting extraterritorial application. 140 In rejecting the
plaintiff's negative inference argument, the Fifth Circuit held that
the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws had
not been rebutted.14' Furthermore, the court rejected the argument
that legislative history demonstrated congressional intent to apply
Title VII extraterritorially 4 2 The court held that neither the express
language nor the legislative history of the Act overcomes the inference
against extraterritorial jurisdiction.13
The Fifth Circuit view was specifically rejected in Bryant v. Inter-
national School Services, Inc. '44 In Bryant, the defendant argued that
Title VII did not apply extraterritorially and therefore, the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Rejecting this argument, the court
working in Saudi Arabia for Aramco, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Saudi Arabia. Boureslan claimed he was subjected to racial, religious, and ethnic
harassment which eventually culminated with his termination. He claimed his termination
violated Title VII. Id. at 1016-18.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1018. The court stated "Extraterritorial application is not directly addressed in
Title VII." Id. The court based its holding on the definitional sections in Title VII, specifically
the definition of "employer" and the definition of "commerce." Id. See also supra note 71
(defining "employer" and "commerce").
140. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1018. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
141. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1018. The court reasoned that this exemption supported the
finding in Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co. that aliens were protected employees in the United
States. Id.
142. Id. The court stated that the "[llegislative history is relegated to a secondary source
behind the language of the statute in determining congressional intent; even in its secondary
role legislative history must be used 'cautiously."' Id.
What the court fails to recognize is the use by the United States Supreme Court of legislative
history when it determined the extraterritorial application of the Eight Hour Law. See Foley
Brothers v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949). See also infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text
(explaining use of legislative history when determining extraterritorial application of United
States law).
143. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1021.
144. Bryant v. International School Serv., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980). In Bryant,
the plaintiffs were teachers employed by the defendant, an American corporation, to teach
overseas. The plaintiffs charged that the defendant's practice of using two different contracts
for hiring overseas teachers amounted to sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Id. at
479-80.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 3
adopted an approach contrary to that of the Boureslan court. The
Bryant court held that extraterritorial jurisdiction could be inferred
from the language of Title VII.' 4 The court based its finding of
extraterritorial jurisdiction on the "alien exemption provision". Since
Title VII expressly excludes protection of aliens employed abroad,
Congress must have intended for Title VII to apply to Americans
employed abroad. 146
B. General Principles of Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Laws
The Boureslan court agrees that the U.S. government is not pre-
cluded by international law from governing the conduct of its own
citizens in foreign countries. 147 However, by requiring an express
grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction; the court erred in its interpre-
tation of congressional intent. The court's analysis is in direct conflict
with prior case law regarding extraterritorial application of U.S.
laws. 48
Extraterritorial application was applied to the Lanham Trademark
Act in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. 149 In Steele, the United States
Supreme Court found an American citizen manufacturing watches in
Mexico liable for violations under the Trademark Act." 0 The Court
began its analysis with the general premise that U.S. laws do not
extend beyond its borders absent congressional intent to the con-
trary.'-" The Court found the requisite congressional intent in the
broad jurisdictional language of the statute. 52 Like Title VII, the
145. Id. See also Love v. Pullman Co., 569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying Title VII
extraterritorially); Street, Application of U.S. Fair Employment Laws to Transnational Em-
ployers in the United States and Abroad, 19 J. INT'L L. & POL. 357, 369 (1987). Mr. Street
suggests that, in addition to the holdings of Bryant and Love, the broad language used in
Title VII supports extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id. at 370.
146. Bryant, 502 F. Supp. at 482; Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274-75 (King, J., dissenting).
147. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1017; see also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286
(1952) (citing Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941)) (a sovereign may control its citizens
abroad).
148. See Steele, 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
149. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 282-83, 285.
152. Id. at 283-84. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). The Act specifically states that its
intent is:
to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the
deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks
in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commece [sic] from
interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such
commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such
commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations
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Lanham Trademark Act does not specifically address extraterritorial
application.5 3 The Trademark Act, however, defines the commerce
to which it applies as being "all commerce which may be lawfully
regulated by Congress."' 15 4 The Court relied heavily on this definition
in finding that Congress intended for the Act to apply extraterrito-
rially.15
Likewise, in Foley Brothers v. Filardo,56 the United States Supreme
Court focused on the question of whether Congress intended for the
Eight Hour Law to apply extraterritorially 5 7 In finding that the law
did not extend extraterritorially, the Court first examined the plain
language of the statute; next, the Court examined the legislative
intent; and finally, administrative interpretations. 8 Because Congress
had not distinguished between U.S. citizen employees and foreign
citizen employees, the Court found that Congress did not intend to
apply the statute extraterritorially.' 59 The Court noted that by failing
to make this distinction, the statute would invariably conflict with
the domestic law of the foreign country. If the Eight Hour Law were
enforced without this distinction, non-citizens working for a U.S.
corporation would be included in the statute's jurisdictional scope.
The Court noted that the only way to avoid potential conflicts was
for Congress to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens. Since
Congress failed to make this distinction, the Court denied extrater-
ritorial application in order to avoid infringing upon the foreign
host's sovereignty. 60
The Supreme Court used a consistent approach in Steele and Foley.
Extraterritorial application of a law may be found without an explicit
statement by Congress. Extraterritorial application will follow if
of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and
conventions respecting trade-marks, trade names, and unfair competition entered
into between the United States and foreign nations.
Id.
153. Steele, 344 U.S. at 283-84.
154. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988) (definition of commerce under the Lanham
Trademark Act).
155. Steele, 344 U.S. at 286.
156. 336 U.S. 281 (1949). In Foley, the employee, a United States citizen, worked for an
employer who has contracted to build certain public works for the United States in Iraq and
Iran. During his work in Iraq and Iran, the employee requested overtime pay for the hours
worked over eight hours a day. The employer refused and the employee brought suit under
the Eight Hour Law. The employer claimed that the law did not apply extraterritorially to
contracts in foreign lands. Id. at 283.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 285-88.
159. Id. at 286, 289.
160. Id.
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evidence demonstrates that Congress intends to regulate conduct
beyond U.S. borders. Evidence may come from an act's express
provisions, its legislative history, or administrative interpretations of
the law. Application of this analysis to Title VII shows that Congress
intended for Title VII to extend extraterritorially.
The Boureslan court downplayed the significance of legislative
history in determining extraterritorial jurisdiction. 6' The court's cau-
tious approach to legislative history directly conflicts with the ap-
proach in Steele and Foley. In Foley, legislative history was one of
three factors the Court weighed in determining that the Eight Hour
Law did not apply abroad. 162 The express language of the Eight Hour
Law revealed that it could be read only in a way which would create
potential conflicts in international law.13 Its legislative history did
not indicate whether Congress intended to regulate work hours of
foreign operations,' 64 and the administrative opinions were silent
regarding the law's geographical scope. 165 The Supreme Court gave
credence to each factor despite its finding that none supported
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court's step-by-step approach establishes a model
for analyzing any question concerning extraterritorial application of
U.S. law. Failure of a lower court to follow the Foley test creates
suspicion regarding that court's decision. Only after a thorough
Foley-type analysis should extraterritorial application be accepted or
rejected. In Boureslan, the Fifth Circuit's rejection of the plaintiff's
evidence regarding legislative intent, and of his negative inference
argument, creates a new test which does not conform to the U.S.
Supreme Court's model in Foley. In effect, by refusing to acknowl-
edge the plaintiff's evidence, the Fifth Circuit has said that extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction can be granted only by express congressional
provision. This approach is unsupported by prior case law. Moreover,
Foley and Bulova clearly reject this arbitrary approach. If the factors
specified by the Supreme Court in Foley, specifically, statutory
language, legislative intent, and administrative interpretations, are
applied to Title VII, a finding of extraterritorial jurisdiction is
warranted.
161. Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1018 (5th Cir. 1988).
162. Foley, 366 U.S. 281, 285-90.
163. Id. at 285.
164. Id. at 286.
165. Id. at 288.
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C. Application of General Principles of Extraterritorial
Application to Title VII
1. Plain Language of Title VII
Title VII does not expressly state that it will apply extraterritori-
ally.1 The Bryant court and the dissent in Boureslan argued that
the "alien exemption provision" created a negative inference sup-
porting the extraterritorial application of Title VII.167 The Foley
decision supports this analysis. Title VII's exclusion of aliens em-
ployed abroad prevents the potential conflicts with foreign law which
had concerned the Foley court. 16 Congress would not have included
an alien exemption if it had not been concerned with potential
conflicts that extraterritorial application would create.1 69 If Congress
had not intended for Title VII to have applied to U.S. employees
working outside the United States, it would not have specifically
excluded aliens, since aliens logically would have been included in
the general exclusion.1 70 By including the "alien exemption provi-
sion," Congress recognized and resolved the concerns expressed by
the Supreme Court in Foley.17 1
Additionally, congressional intent for extraterritorial application of
Title VII is found through a process of statutory incorporation. Title
VII defines "industry effecting commerce," in part, as "any industry
which affects commerce within the meaning of the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959" (LMRDA).172 The
LMRDA, in turn, specifies that an "industry affecting commerce"
includes any activity or industry under the Labor Management Re-
lations Act (LMRA) .173 Therefore, the definition of commerce in the
LMRA must apply to Title VII. The LMRA defines "commerce" as
"trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among
the several States, or between the District of Columbia or any
Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. 1985).
167. See supra notes 144-48.
168. Foley, 336 U.S. at 286.
169. Comment, Boureslan v. Aramco: Equal Employment Opportunity for U.S. Citizens
Abroad, 12 FoRwiDHM INT'L L.J. 564 (1989).
170. Id.
171. Bryant v. International School Serv. Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
173. 29 U.S.C. § 402(c) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
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between any foreign country . . . . "174 In as much as the LMRA
covers "trade between foreign countries," it follows that so must
Title VII. Furthermore, just as the Bulova Court found extraterri-
torial application based on the broad definition of commerce in the
Lanham Trademark Act, future courts should apply the same analysis
and reach the same conclusion in regard to Title VII's jurisdiction.
Therefore, the incorporation of the LMRDA and the LMRA into
Title VII clearly shows that Congress intended for Title VII to apply
to U.S. corporations operating in foreign countries.
2. Legislative History
The dual purpose of Title VII, to prevent discrimination in the
workplace 175 and to protect the free flow of commerce domestically
and with foreign nations,'176 shows that Congress contemplated the
extraterritorial reach of Title VII. General principles underlying Title
VII also support such a finding. In order to remove discriminatory
barriers to employment, 77 Title VII must uniformly protect U.S.
citizens employed by U.S. corporations, regardless of where that
employment exists. Title VII will bring down the barriers which
would otherwise be fortified if U.S. corporations were allowed to
discriminate among U.S. citizens in foreign countries.
3. Administrative Agencies
As the administrative agency in charge of administering Title VII,
the EEOC has issued opinions stating its policy that Title VII applies
to U.S. corporations operating abroad. 17 According to the U.S.
Supreme Court, such administrative opinions should be given great
weight when interpreting statutes. 79 Therefore, even if the statutory
language and legislative history are not entirely convincing, giving
great weight to the clear mandates of the EEOC will certainly
guarantee extraterritorial application of the Act.
174. 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
175. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
176. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 31-34.
178. EEOC Issues Guidance for Handling Bias Charges Against Foreign Companies, U.S.
Employers Overseas, 183 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-1 (Sept. 21, 1988) (WESTLAW, Labor
& Employment, Specialized Databases, BNA-DLR.)
179. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Japanese corporate hiring practices which stem from its culture
are at odds with Title VII. Because of this conflict, application of
Title VII either extraterritorially or to Japanese companies operating
in the United States could slow the equalization of U.S.-Japan trade.
For example, Japanese employers may argue that because few Jap-
anese companies employ women in managerial positions, Japanese
corporations operating in the United States may be put to a com-
petitive disadvantage with their home country counterparts. More-
over, given the current trade disparity between the United States and
Japan, and the possibility that application of Title VII would expand
this gap, American employers doing business in Japan may argue
that extraterritorial application is not a desirable goal.
These concerns, however, only echo those heard when the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was enacted. Legitimizing the same types of fears
which have already been resoundingly disproved would gut the ef-
fectiveness of Title VII. Furthermore, if Title VII is not applied,
corporations would benefit by escaping U.S. public policy which
condemns discrimination, while at the same time reaping the benefits
from public policies which protect free enterprise. Corporations should
not be allowed to enjoy both the benefits of some U.S. public policies
while choosing to avoid others.
The courts should not undermine the very purpose for which Title
VII was enacted: to break down discriminatory employment barriers.
If corporations, either U.S. or Japanese, are able to avoid Title VII,
these barriers flourish rather than dissipate. Barriers to equal em-
ployment opportunities will be fortified by these newly recognized
exceptions. Equality for women can never be reached in the United
States if Japanese corporations operating within the United States,
or U.S. corporations operating in Japan, are allowed to practice sex
discrimination.
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